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   The Uses of Binary Thinking 
         Peter Elbow 
Chapter Three in Everyone Can Write: Essays Toward a Hopeful 
Theory of Writing and Teaching Writing. Oxford UP 2000.   It is 
slightly revised from the version in the Journal of Advanced 
Composition 13.1 (Winter1993). 
 
There is an ancient tradition of binary or dichotomous thinking--of framing 
issues in terms of opposites such as sun/moon or reason/passion.  G. E. R. Lloyd 
speaks of “the remarkable prevalence of theories based on opposition in so 
many societies at different stages of technological development.”  He goes on to 
give these reasons:  
[M]any prominent phenomena in nature exhibit a certain duality:  day 
alternates with night;  the sun rises in one quarter of the sky and sets in 
the opposite quarter;  in most climates the contrast between the seasons 
(summer and winter, or dry season and rainy season) is marked;  in the 
larger animals male and female are distinct, and the bilateral symmetry 
of their bodies is obvious. . . .  Antithesis is an element in any 
classification, and the primary form of antithesis, one may say, is division 
into two groups--so that the simplest form of classification, by the same 
token, is a dualist one. (80) 
This tradition of binary thinking is still strong and forms a kind of foundation 
for the many varieties of structuralism.  We see this tradition illustrated, for 
example, in Lévi-Strauss’ classic structuralist title, The Raw and the Cooked.  
But in recent years, especially with the deconstructive reaction against 
structuralism, we have seen strong criticism of binary thinking.  Hélene Cixous 
is one of many voices arguing that wherever there are polar oppositions, there is 
dominance:  some classic terms are day/night, sun/moon, reason/passion--and 
of course lurking behind all of these pairs is usually gender: male/female.  
According to this critique, binary thinking almost always builds in dominance or 
privilege--sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly.  (For a strong example of 
this critique, see LaCapra 23-24).   
Even when people try to overturn or reverse the traditional dominance in a 
polar opposition--proclaiming for example that dark is better than light, passion 
than reason, female than male--it just means that the underdog is redefined as 
overdog, and we are still left with thinking in terms of dominance or hierarchy.  
One side is privileged.  Furthermore (so goes this critique), we don’t get away 
from the problem even when we avoid giving victory to one side and instead 
work out a compromise or else a Hegelian synthesis into a new, third term.  
When the Hegelian bulldozer pushes toward “higher” order or unity--even if the 
compromise is really “fair” and the synthesis doesn’t favor either the thesis or 
antithesis--difference and diversity are eliminated.  Jonathan Culler neatly 
pinpoints this large critical position in his summary of Paul de Man’s thinking: 
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Deconstruction seeks to undo all oppositions that, in the name of unity, 
purity, order, and hierarchy, try to eliminate difference (278). 
Even though Culler and de Man are complaining about binary thinking and I 
am defending it, I want to take this quotation as a kind of foundation for my 
essay.  For I am defending only one kind or mode of binary thinking.  I think I can 
show that binary thinking, if handled in the right way, will serve as a way to avoid 
the very problems Culler and de Man are troubled by: “purity, order, and 
hierarchy.”  That is, binary thinking can serve to encourage difference--indeed 
encourage nondominance, nontranscendence, instability, disorder.    
In making this point, I’m also calling on a venerable tradition.  For there are 
really two traditions of binary or dialectical thinking.  The better known is the 
Hegelian tradition.  It uses binary thinking as a motor always to press on to a 
third term or a higher category that represents a transcendent reconciliation or 
unity:  thesis and antithesis are always harnessed to yield synthesis.  Since 
Hegel, the ancient and broad term dialectic has tended to be narrowed to 
connote this three-termed process.   
The lesser noted but older tradition of binary thinking that I am calling on 
used the term “dialectic” long before Hegel.  This tradition sees value in 
accepting, putting up with, indeed seeking the nonresolution of the two terms:  
not feeling that the opposites must be somehow reconciled, not feeling that the 
itch must be scratched.  This tradition goes as far back as the philosophy of 
yin/yang.  In the West we see it in Socrates, Plato, and Boethius.  This tradition of 
the “coincidence of opposites” was strong the middle ages (Peter Abelard, Sic 
et Non).  Perhaps the most common recent champion of this approach is Jung 
with his emphasis on paired forces in the collective unconscious and the need 
always to strengthen the weaker in any pairing.  Coleridge rides this tradition a 
bit:  how the poet “brings the whole soul of man into activity” with “opposite or 
discordant qualities” such as sameness/difference, idea/image, 
general/concrete, manner/matter (II, 12).* 
------------------------------------------------ 
*Here are some formulations deriving from this tradition: 
Blake.  “Without contraries is no progression.”  “Opposition is true Friendship.”   
Keats.  “. . . capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable 
reaching after fact and reason.” (Letters) 
Bakhtin.  “Not a dialectical either/or, but a dialogic both/and” (Clark and Holquist 7). 
Dewey.  “Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites.  It is given to formulating 
its beliefs in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognizes no intermediate 
possibilities” (17).  Dewey could be said to structure his whole philosophy around 
the rejection of either/or thinking and the development of both/and thinking. 
Niels Bohr.  “The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement.  But the opposite 
of a profound truth may well be another profound truth.” 
Yeats.  “No mind can engender until divided into two.” 
F. Scott Fitzgerald.  “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two 
opposed ideas in mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.” 
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Mary Belenky et al:  “[Constructed knowers] show a high tolerance for internal 
contradiction and ambiguity.  They abandon completely the either/or thinking . . . 
[and] recognize the inevitability of conflict and stress . . . “ (137).  (William Perry’s 
Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years sounds the same 
theme.) 
---------------------------------------------- 
Chaucer was deeply indebted to Boethius, and it was during my work on 
Chaucer that I first became aware of this tradition of binary thinking.  Since then 
I’ve repeatedly seen the value of this approach:  noticing oppositions or 
conflicts, even seeking them, but leaving them unresolved.  Practice with this 
approach has led me to suspect that when we encounter something that is 
difficult or complicated or something that tangles people into endless debate, 
we are often in the presence of an opposition that needs to be made more 
explicit--and left unreconciled.  (See my Oppositions in Chaucer and, more 
recently, Thomas Reed, Middle English Debate Poetry and the Aesthetics of 
Irresolution.  I broadened the scope of this theme in my book of essays, 
Embracing Contraries: Explorations in Learning and Teaching.) 
 
        Why Dichotomies? 
 
I hear an obvious objection at this point.  “You say you are interested in 
complexity, but it sounds as though your real goal is to save binary thinking.  If 
you really want complexity, why keep everything in neat pairs?” 
Yes, two is not a very large or complex number.  Having three or more 
options is lovely.  Nothing in this paper argues against framing issues in terms of 
more than two sides.  As long as there’s more than one!  Seeing three or five 
sides is fine, but it is often just a way to talk about one of them as right and the 
others as wrong.  The argument against binaries and for multiplicity is often a 
cover for letting one side be the real winner--in short for hierarchy and 
singleness of truth.  Thus my deeper goal in this paper is not to preserve pairs or 
binaries in themselves so much as to get away from simple, single truth:  to have 
situations of balance, irresolution, nonclosure, nonconsensus, nonwinning.   
So multiplicity may be fine, but I focus this paper on the problem of binary 
thinking because in fact there is no hope of getting away from it in some form or 
another.  Binary thinking is the path of least resistance for human perceiving, 
thinking, and for linguistic structures.  To perceive is to notice a category over 
against difference, and the simplest path is in terms of simple opposition.  The 
easiest way to classify complex information is to clump it into two piles.  Indeed 
the most instinctive and tempting clumps to use for complex data are the old 
favorites: ours/theirs, like/don’t like, right/sinister, sheep/goats.  This is why 
dichotomies tend to come packaged with positive and negative poles (see 
Herrnstein-Smith 122).  It may be that the very structure of our bodies and our 
placement in phenomenal reality invite us to see things in terms of binary 
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oppositions, e.g., right/left, up/down, front/back, near/far, male/female (see 
Lakoff and Johnson).  The very same poststructuralists who are so unhappy 
about too many binary oppositions in structuralism seem to invite far more of 
them into their very model for how human language and meaning function: 
[E]lements of a text do not have intrinsic meaning as autonomous entities 
but derive their significance from oppositions which are in turn related to 
other oppositions in a process of theoretically infinite semiosis.  
To speak of the concept of ‘brown,’ for example, is, according to 
semiotics, a way of referring to a complex network of oppositions which 
articulates the spectrum of colors on the one hand and the spectrum of 
sounds on the other (Culler, Signs 29, 41). 
The question, then, is not whether to deal with dichotomies but how to deal 
with them.  We have five basic options: 
1. Choose one side as right or better.  This is “either/or” thinking.   
2. Work out a compromise or a dialectical synthesis, i.e., find a third term. 
3. Deny there is any conflict (e.g., “There is no difference between form and 
content” or “There is no conflict between teaching and research”). 
4. Affirm both sides of the dichotomy as equally true or necessary or 
important or correct.  This is the approach I argue in this essay. 
  4a. Same approach with an emphasis on mystical unity in the 
duality. 
5. Reframe the conflict or analyze it in more detail so there are more than 
two sides.  This, is of course another good path.  It is not the focus of this 
essay, but it is exactly the method I use in making this list.  And it is the 
central intellectual tool I use in my two most ambitious pieces here:  my 
essay about voice (10 in Part III of this volume) and my essay about private 
writing (12 in Part IV). 
The first three options are the most common and habitual ways we deal 
with dichotomy or conflict because humans seem to be uncomfortable with what 
is unreconciled or incompatible.  When we are presented with conflicting data, 
our organism itself seems to want somehow to find some kind of harmony or 
unity.  Psychologists can explain the most diverse range of human thinking, 
feeling, and behavior in terms of our instinctive resistance to “cognitive 
dissonance.”  Even in the simplest act of visual perception, the retina and brain 
are both presented with swiftly, constantly shifting inputs or data, but what we 
“see” is virtually always a stable object or category (see Peckham). 
In short, even though binary oppositions tempt people to oversimple, 
black/white thinking, binary oppositions also present us with uniquely valuable 
occasions for balance, irresolution, nonclosure, nonconsensus, nonwinning.  So 
I will celebrate and explore here the approach to binary oppositions that seems 
to go against the human grain and that requires some conscious discipline:  
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affirming both sides of a dichotomy as equally true or important--even if they are 
contradictory.   
I’m not going so far as to say that we should balance every dichotomy we 
encounter.  Sometimes one side is right and the other one wrong.  Indeed when 
we need to make difficult value judgments or sort out slippery distinctions, 
pairings are an enormous help.  Opticians harness this process to help us figure 
out which lens is best when there is a multiplicity of lenses to choose among.  
You could sum up this whole essay as an exercise in saying, “There are two 
kinds of binary thinking, the good kind and the bad kind.”  In truth all five ways of 
dealing with oppositions that I just listed above are valid and useful methods in 
one situation or another.  But I write this essay because I see a need for more 
effort in noticing the many situations where the easy, good/bad distinction gets 
us in trouble and where the multiplicity of options is a cover for simply trying to 
win--and where instead we need balance and nonresolution.  
 
      Binary Thinking in Action: Seven Cases 
I will apply this balancing kind of binary thinking to a diverse set of cases:  
writing, teaching, thinking/learning, teaching/research, form/content, 
reading/writing, private/social.  I hope to show that this kind of thinking will have 
useful explanatory power. 
 
(1) Writing 
To write well we need to call on two opposite abilities or activities: 
generating and criticizing.  That is, on the one hand we need to come up with 
lots of words and thoughts--something that is easiest if we adopt a noncritical, 
nonevaluative mentality of welcoming yea-saying.  But on the other hand, we 
can’t write well unless we evaluate, criticize and reject--something that is 
easiest if we adopt a mentality of tough-minded, skeptical, nay-saying. 
In recent years, some people have called this view an outmoded piece of 
dichotomous thinking, arguing that the opposition between generating and 
criticizing breaks down:  There is no difference between generating and 
criticizing or rejecting.  To generate one word is to reject a host of other words 
we could have put down.  Every piece of generating is by the same token also a 
piece of criticizing.  The dichotomy between generating and criticizing is an 
accident of words--a case of being fooled by our categories. 
This objection is a logical quibble.  Even though generating X may seem the 
same as rejecting Y and Z in the realm of logic, the two acts are crucially 
different in the realm of human experience.  It can happen that in generating X I 
also rejected or criticized Y and Z, but if so, it means that I  actually generated 
all three--X, Y, and Z all came to mind.  But often enough when we generate X, 
it’s the only thing that comes to mind;  Y and Z are nowhere in mind to be 
rejected or criticized.  The point of the dichotomy is to distinguish between the 
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experience of writing down X when it’s the only thing in mind and the very 
different experience of writing it down when you also have Y and Z in mind.  
What I’m pursuing here is the difference between two different experiences or 
abilities, generating and criticizing.  What’s important about them is that they 
are both variables.  At any moment of writing, we may be generating a great deal 
or not very much;  at any moment we may be criticizing a great deal or not very 
much.   
The same criticism can be framed in terms of criticizing:  Every act of 
criticism is simultaneously an act of generating or creating.  Here again, this can 
happen:  the act of criticizing X causes Y to pop into mind.  And here again my 
model insists that both mental events occurred:  criticizing and generating.  
Excellent.  But far too often it works the other way:  criticizing X makes nothing 
at all pop into mind.  Generating and criticizing are variables that can occur 
together, but they often occur apart.  Most commonly, they occur more 
vigorously in each others’ absence because they tend to get in each other’s 
way. 
If we honor the binary opposition between generating and criticizing, we 
get a model with considerable explanatory power.  By noticing how generating 
and criticizing get in each other’s way, we can see some of the difficulties of 
writing more clearly, and understand why the scenarios often play out as they 
do.  People’s characteristic way of getting things written often represents their 
way of negotiating the conflict between generating and criticizing. 
 When writing goes very badly, we are stuck or blocked.  It’s a case of 
being tied in knots by trying to be generative and critical at the same 
time.  Some writers are characteristically blocked.  Their writing method 
is the famous one of staring at the paper till blood breaks out on their 
foreheads.   
 When writing goes passably but not very well, it is usually because we 
are having to negotiate a compromise between these conflicting 
mentalities.  Sometimes generating gets the upper hand.  We manage to 
pour out a lot of material but we cannot prune and shape it well for lack 
of cogent criticism.  Writers who habitually fall into this path tend to 
produce work that is rich but undisciplined.  In contrast, sometimes 
criticizing gets the upper hand.  Then we end up a with good result but 
very little of it, because we saw so many faults in every thought and 
sentence as we were engaged in trying to write it.  Writers with this habit 
produce work that is cramped or tight.  (Because editors specialize in 
vigilant criticism, many of them have difficulty writing themselves.  
Teachers often have the same problem since they spend so much time 
criticizing student writing.) 
 When writing goes very well (as it occasionally does), we seem able to 
reach out for just the right word and yet at the same moment (seemingly 
without effort or even awareness), we put aside countless possibilities 
that aren’t just right.  Generating and criticizing are going on 
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simultaneously.  A few excellent writers have learned to operate this way 
consistently;  they have learned magic integration. 
Commentators have always had a hard time explaining what it is that 
wonderful writers do--ascribing it to genius or magic or the muses or whatever.  
Writers themselves give remarkably contradictory accounts of what they’re 
doing:  “It’s all inspiration!”  “It’s all perspiration!”  “It’s all system!”  “It’s all 
magic and serendipity!”  This is just what we can expect if people are trying to 
explain a complex skill which they happened to have learned, but which violates 
normal patterns of thinking.  Their skill represents the ability to be magically 
extreme at both skills.  Transcendence is probably the right word and it is a 
worthy goal to keep in mind.  But somehow it’s not very helpful advice to say, “If 
you want to write well, just transcend opposites.”  Note, however, that many odd 
but in fact traditional pieces of advice for writing are really aids in 
transcendence--e.g., take walks, wait humbly, abnegate the self, pay homage to 
the muses, relinquish agency and control, meditate--or drink! 
Note the social dimension that often lies behind these patterns.  When we 
are more critical, it is often because we have a particularly critical audience in 
mind.  When we are particularly generative or even magically integrated, it is 
often because of a particularly inviting or facilitative audience (see my Writing 
with Power, Section IV). 
The path to really good writing, then, is seldom the path of compromise or 
the golden mean.  If we are only sort of generative and sort of critical, we write 
mediocre stuff:  we don’t have enough to choose from, and we don’t reject ideas 
and words we ought to reject.  We need extremity in both directions.  Instead of 
finding one point on the continuum between two extremes, we need as it were to 
occupy two points near both ends. 
There’s a second way to argue against the dichotomy between generating 
and criticizing:  Sure, of course there’s a difference between them, but spare us 
all your advice about separating them.  That puts us back to the dark ages--back 
to the rigid ‘stage’ theory of writing:  prewriting / writing / rewriting.  No writers 
do that.  Haven’t you heard of all the research showing that writing is recursive? 
I’m not trying to deny that writing is often recursive--or even usually so.  Of 
course generating and criticizing are often going on more or less together, all 
mixed up;  that’s the default mode for lots of people.  My point is that they don’t 
always go on at the same time:  they don’t have to go on at the same time, and in 
fact it’s helpful sometimes consciously to separate them since they get in each 
other’s way.  In short it can pay to learn to make writing less recursive. 
Notice that I am introducing the dimension of time.  What is paradoxical in 
logic--”being both generative and critical--occupying two spots on a single 
continuum”--is ordinary in the realm of time.  Thus the easiest and most practical 
way to negotiate the conflict between generating and criticizing is temporally to 
separate them and engage in them one at a time.  It may seem natural to try to 
find words and thoughts and scrutinize them at the same time to see if they are 
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the right ones;  but we can get skilled at doing these two things one at a time--
thus separating the two mentalities.  (Notice, for example, how in most speaking 
situations, we don’t put much energy into scrutinizing the words as they come to 
mind or to mouth.  And on those occasions when we do scrutinize our words as 
we speak, our speaking tends to be more halting and tangled.)  And in fact many 
writers have gradually learned to pour down words and thoughts helter-skelter 
and then come back to work on them later in a specially vigilant, detached, and 
critical frame of mind--that is, to hold off revising and editing till the end.  The 
time dimension helps us heighten the conflict, not minimize it--permitting us to 
clear an arena in which each side can operate unhampered to an extreme.     
This, then, is the approach to heightening and separating opposites that I 
gradually learned--and I find I can teach it to students and teachers with helpful 
results.  It is a skill.  People often have an easier time taking risks, turning off all 
criticism, and thereby coming up with words and thoughts they didn’t know they 
had, when they know they will have a time later to be wholeheartedly critical and 
get rid of foolishness.  And people often have an easier time being fiercely 
critical if they have first had a chance to generate too many ideas and 
hypotheses.  (I have found it helpful, by the way, to notice a link between this 
generating/criticizing dichotomy and two others:  planning/not planning, and 
controlling/relinquishing control.  Writers commonly talk about the need for 
periods of relaxed planning or control.) 
 
(2) Teaching 
The same kind of conflict lies at the heart of the teaching process.  Good 
teaching calls on two conflicting abilities or stances:  positively affirming and 
critically judging.  That is, on the one hand we benefit if we can function as allies 
and supporters to students--welcoming them and all their thinking--assuming 
they can learn, that they are intelligent, that they have what it takes.  (Teachers’ 
expectations about student abilities, positive or negative, probably have more 
influence on how well students learn than actual differences in teaching 
techniques.  See Rosenthal and Jacobson.)   Yet on the other hand, we also need 
to be on guard--to judge, scrutinize, evaluate, examine, and test.  We have a 
loyalty not just to students but to the body of knowledge we are teaching and to 
society.  We have to evaluate and to criticize what is wrong, reject what is 
unsatisfactory.  In short, to teach well we need skill as host and bouncer, as ally 
and adversary.  Teaching, like writing, may often be recursive, but it is a 
recursive blending or alternation of two conflicting dimensions:  opening the 
gate wide and keeping the gate narrow. 
This conflict explains some of the difficulty most of us experience in 
teaching, but the difficulty is unavoidable because, again, compromise or 
reconciliation is not the answer.  Look at the options.  A happy medium is pretty 
sad:  being only sort of helpful or inviting to students and only sort of vigilant as 
to whether they do decent work.  Similarly, it’s no good only welcoming students 
and never critically examining their work;  nor only criticizing wrong answers 
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and never praising their weak starts or welcoming their risk taking.  Thus most 
teachers are stuck at one point along a continuum that students know so well:  
at one end are the “tough teachers” and at the other end are the “easy 
teachers”;  in the middle are “so-so teachers” and “inconsistent teachers.”  
Inconsistency is understandable since any single position is so unsatisfactory:  
most teachers find themselves muttering these two different phrases to 
themselves at different times:  “Oh, dear, I must have been too harsh” and “From 
now on, no more Mr. Nice Guy.” 
This conflict between contrary teaching roles or mentalities is illustrated in 
the way students often skitter ungracefully between confiding in us as allies and 
guarding against us as adversaries.  And they are right;  we are usually both.  
And these two teaching roles are sometimes institutionalized into separate 
people.  The tutor’s function, for example in a writing center, is to be wholly ally, 
and the examiner’s function is to be wholly judge or adversary.  Since the middle 
ages, Oxford and Cambridge, like many European universities, have 
institutionalized the roles of teacher/tutor and examiner. 
But really skilled teachers somehow find ways to do justice to these 
opposed binaries in all their irreconcilability.  Again we see two ways to do this.  
The harder and rarer path is one of mysterious finesse or transcendence.  That 
is, a few remarkable teachers are extremely tough and inviting at the same time-
-remarkably welcoming to students yet remarkably discriminating in saying, “I 
won’t take anything but the best.”   
The easier and more ordinary path to good teaching involves finding ways 
to separate the two stances:  choosing certain times to be inviting and 
encouraging and choosing other times to be especially discriminatory and 
vigilant.  We tend to be more inviting at the beginning of a course or in our 
opening explorations and explanations of something, and more vigilant at the 
ends of courses and as we test.  Somewhere toward the middle or end of a 
course, students often feel, “Hey, what happened?  I thought this teacher was 
my friend.”  Individual conferences can function as a time for being particularly 
supportive--though also, occasionally, a time for reading the riot act.  (More on 
this whole issue in my “Embracing Contraries in the Teaching Process.”)  
 
(3) Thinking and learning--doubting and believing 
We see the same contradiction at the heart of the intellectual process itself:  
a conflict between doubting and believing.  The centrality of doubting is obvious.  
The ability to find flaws or contradictions has been foundational in the 
development of logic and in the critical tradition running from Socrates through 
Descartes and undiminished to the present.  Criticism and skepticism are 
usually identified with intelligence itself.  People tend to assume that real 
thinking or good thinking is critical thinking. 
Less noticed, however, is the central need in the intellectual process for 
skill in believing:  the ability to enter into, experience, or try on ideas or points of 
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view different from the ones we presently hold.  Since “credulity,” the tendency 
just to go along with whatever seems attractive or appealing or persuasive, is 
often a problem in the thinking of children or unsophisticated adults--and since 
schooling and careful thinking seem to consist of the process of giving up 
credulity in favor being more critical minded or skeptical--people have tended to 
see belief as a problem in the intellectual life.  Intellectuals and academics often 
overlook the fact that few people are genuinely skilled at thinking and learning 
unless they are also skilled at entering into and even believing ideas and points 
of view that are different from what they are used to and difficult to take on.  In 
short, we need skill both at doubting even what looks right, and at believing even 
what looks crazy or alien.  This is one reason why good thinking and learning are 
so hard. 
Of course most thinking involves some kind of combination or recursive 
intertwining of these mental activities, and it feels artificial to most people to try 
to separate them.  But that feeling is misleading.  It stems from the dominance of 
criticism in our culture’s model of thinking and learning.  In fact we are all 
perfectly accustomed to one form of trying to separate doubting and believing:  
trying to remove all credulity or believing in order to clear a space for 
unimpeded, dispassionate criticism or doubting.  Intellectuals are not 
accustomed, however, to trying to remove all doubting and criticism in order to 
clear a space for unimpeded, focused entering in or believing. 
So here is the same kind of dichotomy I’ve applied to the activities of 
writing and teaching.  Intellectual skill represents skill at opposites:  both 
accepting and rejecting, both swallowing and spitting out, both letting oneself 
be invaded and keeping oneself intact.  And similarly, at moments of 
consummate skill in thinking, we seem to be able to manage what is paradoxical:  
we can take on what is alien, odd, and unknown--yet we are acute in our 
discriminating rejections. 
Let me summarize these three cases before going on to others.  I’m arguing 
the benefits of one kind of binary thinking for a better understanding of writing, 
teaching, and thinking:  the process of heightening opposites but holding them 
unresolved--giving equal affirmation to both sides.  This model explains much of 
the difficulty of these three activities, and the natural patterns of distribution of 
skills in them.  Most commonly, people negotiate a kind of zero-sum compromise 
between conflicting skills or mentalities:  they are strong at generating, being 
open, and believing and correspondingly weak at the opposite side;  or strong at 
criticizing, being on guard, judging, and doubting, and weak at the opposite 
side;  or else middling at both.  Excellence is difficult because it requires doing 
justice to conflicting demands--somehow getting out of the zero-sum economy.  
Meeting those demands simultaneously is especially rare--and mysterious.  
What’s easier and more feasible is to meet the conflicting demands one at a 
time, though this leads to a process that is less seamless and graceful--more 
bumpy, back and forth, and artificial.  It is thus a recursive process.  However, if 
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we switch back and forth too rapidly, we often find it harder to become 
productively extreme at one mentality or the other.  
In these three examples I have been emphasizing oppositions or conflicts 
that are often unnoticed or overlooked.  I turn now to dichotomies that are much-
noticed--binaries that are traditional and prominent.     
 
(4) Teaching vs. research 
“No problem.  Teaching and research reinforce each other.”  This is the 
latest doctrine--and a prime case of unclear, wishful thinking.  Of course 
research can help teaching and vice-versa--just as generating can reinforce 
criticizing if handled well.  Research can improve teachers by making them 
more intellectually lively.  (But what about the deadly dull teachers who loved 
research?)  Teaching can improve researchers (this is a bit of a stretch) by 
helping them be more aware of the relationships between what they are 
investigating and how most people see and learn things.  But it is weak thinking 
to slide from there into the ever-recurring pious doctrine that there is no conflict 
between teaching and research.  
The two activities conflict in the most obvious and concrete way by 
competing for our time, attention and loyalty.  The extensive time I’m spending 
on this essay is time I cannot spend on my teaching.  I get completely 
preoccupied as I am writing it and find myself putting off the preparation or 
reading I ought to do for my classes.  When I’m engaged in a piece of writing and 
research, I tend to think about it in my free time.  When I’m not so engaged, I 
tend to think about my students and my teaching in my free time.  What I do in my 
research may make me a smarter more thoughtful teacher, but I can scarcely 
apply this work to my teaching--even though this essay has remarkably strong 
links to teaching.  Few faculty members can bring their research directly into 
their undergraduate teaching.   
But it’s not just a matter of wishful thinking.  When people claim that there 
is no conflict between teaching and research, they are usually, consciously or 
not, papering over a deeply entrenched hierarchy or dominance of research 
over teaching at universities and most four-year colleges.  Teachers and 
administrators at two-year colleges and in the schools don’t seem so tempted to 
proclaim that there is no conflict between teaching and research. 
Because this has become a political matter, it’s particularly important to try 
to think carefully about it.  Yes, it is a benefit if teachers also research and 
researchers also teach.  But it is simply wrong to say that people can’t do one 
well without doing the other.  However, this is no argument that people can 
teach well without relief--without time for reading, thinking, and discussion with 
colleagues.  Teaching is an intellectually and personally draining process of 
putting out.  To teach well requires time for taking in and reflecting.  But it’s 
sloppy thinking to assume that research is the only way for teachers to think and 
reflect and intellectually renew themselves.  
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The important point illuminated by my model is this:  teaching and research 
don’t need each other.  It’s only a certain model of being an academic that needs 
both teaching and research.  Let me illustrate this structural point from the 
previous topics I’ve treated. 
 To write well requires skill in both generating and criticizing;  but generating 
and criticizing in themselves have no need of each other. 
 To teach well requires skill in both supportively affirming and critically 
judging;  but affirming and judging have no need of each other.  
 To think well requires skill in both doubting and believing, but those two 
activities do fine on their own. 
Thus teachers can be outstanding without doing research--just as researchers 
can be outstanding without teaching.  Before World War II, few academics did 
much writing or research, nor was it expected of most.  Only the few research 
universities of the era demanded research.  Since then, the university model has 
been spreading throughout all of higher education. 
So what does this model of binary thinking tell us about how to improve the 
relationship between teaching and research?  We can follow the same principles 
here as above.  A few really gifted people can make teaching and research work 
together simultaneously.  But most people need to take steps to keep the two 
from getting in each others’ way--which usually means finding times to give full 
attention and commitment to each one separately.  Full attention is important 
because what we want is extremity in both sides.  We don’t want half-hearted 
teaching and half-hearted research, we want deeply committed teaching and 
research.  Some people can give full attention to research for a few hours each 
day and switch their full attention to teaching for the rest of the day.  Most 
people can’t switch back and forth so quickly and need longer periods to commit 
themselves to one or the other.  The most pressing question now is how to 
nurture what is usually the weaker or shadow side of the dichotomy, teaching.  
We’ll never improve it by blithely proclaiming that there is no conflict and that 
research always helps teaching--meanwhile continuing to give most incentives 
to research and few to teaching.  We have to decide whether we are willing to 
give the incentives to teaching without which it can never thrive. 
But there is a larger and trickier question lurking here.  Should we preserve 
and enshrine the research university model for all academics?  Should we insist 
that people cannot be academics unless they teach and do research?  The 
model of binary thinking does not give an answer to this essentially political 
question.  A promising suggestion, however, comes from the Carnegie 
Commission (Boyer):  a conception of “research” that isn’t so much at odds with 
teaching because it doesn’t necessarily involve conventional competitive 
publication.  The essential point here is to allow “research” to involve input and 
reflection, and not require it always to mean output in the form of competitive 
publication. 
 
  34 
(5) Form vs. content 
“Form and content are indissoluble.  We can’t distinguish them or judge one 
apart from the other.  Surely you don’t want to be associated with old fashioned 
school teachers who give split grades!”   
This view is intriguing in light of the history of fashion in English studies.  In 
recent years, there’s been a kind of bandwagon attempt to disown everything 
connected with New Criticism, yet here’s a New Critical doctrine that has 
somehow stayed enshrined. 
Of course form and content are linked--indeed they are often functions of 
each other.  Change in one requires change in the other--at least to some 
degree.  But mathematicians would be startled to hear anyone claiming that we 
cannot distinguish between entities that are functions of each other.  The idea 
that we cannot distinguish or even evaluate form and content separately also 
flies in the face of careful thought--not to mention common sense and common 
practice. 
It’s the same here as with the other contraries:  opposites do fuse or 
magically interact when everything is going perfectly.  That is, in the ideal poem, 
form and content function just as the doctrine proclaims they should:  we can’t 
tell the dancer from the dance.  But in ordinary sublunary texts, we have no 
trouble telling which is the dancer.  The reason the text is not magical is that 
dancer and dance don’t perfectly realize each other.  When we look at imperfect 
texts or texts in progress or nonliterary texts--e.g., student texts and our own 
texts and most published texts as opposed to Keats’ best poems--we can usually 
tell that the content is working better than the form, or vice versa.  Most of what 
we say about texts implies a recognition of the difference between form and 
content, and most of the changes we make in any text are changes we make 
because we can palpably feel how the form and content don’t work as well 
together as they should.  
When people deny an opposition or distinction that exists, we need to ask if 
the denial serves to mystify something.  In the realm of grading, when people 
say, “I can’t distinguish between content and form,” they are often refusing to 
name or figure out--or be consistent in--the hidden criteria that determine their 
grades.  In the realm of literary studies, the doctrine that form and content are 
indistinguishable has often served to give special honor to form--to enshrine the 
superiority of poetry over prose, and the inferiority of texts that are easily 
paraphrased or summarized compared to those that are not. 
 
(6) Reading vs. writing 
Reading and writing would seem marry nicely and reinforce each other 
without conflict.  And this is exactly the case when all is going optimally--just as 
teaching and research can reinforce each other.  Input can serve output, and 
vice-versa.  We want our readers to be writers and our writers to be readers.  
But the idea that there is no conflict here is a classic case of doctrine shielding 
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the privilege of one spouse over the other.  (This is a large subject that I have 
treated at length in my “War Between Reading and Writing,” printed in this 
volume.)  What could be more different than the two root processes:  trying to fit 
your mind around and take in words someone else chose, and trying to choose 
your own words and put them out and get others to fit their minds around them?  
What interests me are the differences in agency and control for the learner in 
both processes. 
Between readers and writer, there is an obvious conflict of interest  about 
who gets to decide the meaning and interpretation of a text.  It’s in the interest of 
writers that they should decide what their own text means;  it’s in the interest of 
readers to say that only they can decide.  There’s no right answer.  Either/or, 
zero-sum arguments are a trap.  Both points of view must be given full or even 
extreme validity.  At the present critical moment (a moment that has lasted 
rather a long time), dominance rests more with readers than writers.  Most 
critical work assumes that readers get the last word about the meaning of texts--
and indeed that writers must not be trusted on the matter.   
At the most material and political level, we see the dominance of readers in 
the vastly superior working conditions given to teachers of reading or literature 
in higher education compared to conditions for teachers of writing (Slevin).  As a 
writing program director, most of the talk I hear about the harmony between 
reading and writing and their mutual need for each other is used to support 
proposals for scrapping what is virtually the only writing course in college (first 
year writing), in order to change it into a reading-and-writing course.  
Meanwhile, virtually all the other courses in the curriculum are tacitly invited to 
remain as they are, namely, committed primarily to reading.  In sum, reading and 
writing can and should reinforce each other from a position of parity, but talk 
about happy harmony can be viewed with suspicion if it masks the current 
dominance of reading. 
If we look back at the earlier dichotomies I explored, we can see the same 
dynamic.  When people claim that there is no real conflict between teaching and 
research, they are reinforcing an imbalanced status quo.  When people say 
there is no dichotomy between generating and criticizing in writing, or between 
believing and doubting in thinking and learning, they are reinforcing the present 
dominance of criticism and critical thinking in the academic or intellectual 
realm.  They are reinforcing the prevailing set of assumptions that tell us that it 
is a good thing to clear space for nonstop, unrelieved criticism or doubting while 
people write or think;  but it is a bad thing to clear space for nonstop, unrelieved 
generating or believing or making a mess.  Periods of extreme planning and 
control are currently felt to be fine, but not periods of nonplanning or 
relinquishing control.  Extremity in doubting is fine, but extremity in believing is 
bad.  This attitude toward belief is so ingrained in our academic and intellectual 
culture that people don’t realize that what they are afraid of--namely, fanaticism 
or closed-mindedness--represents not extremity of belief but poverty of belief:  
the ability to believe only one thing.   
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7. Private vs. social 
My theme here--and throughout this essay--is to beware happy harmonies 
and mystical unions; look out for declarations of no conflict.  For my last case or 
example, however, I turn to an opposition that the field of rhetoric and 
composition has highlighted or foregrounded--almost to the point of hypnosis.  
Yet this too is a case of a binary that tends to enshrine hierarchy--in this case the 
dominance of the social.  The problem again is either/or thinking. 
Clearly humans are both inherently connected and intertwined with others 
and also inherently separate.  We can focus on either dimension of human 
existence.  When we look from a distance we can see that everything we say or 
write comes from outside--we don’t make up words.  But when we look from 
close up, we can see that every word we speak and write comes to our lips and 
our pens from the inside.   
If we take the trouble to step outside the doctrinal bickering, we can easily 
see that it is a good thing to be more than usually social--but also to be more 
than usually private.  The more we connect and communicate with others, the 
more . . . well, who needs to argue this point these days?  But a moment’s 
thought will also show us that we are clearly better off the more we can hold 
commerce with ourselves, pursue trains of thought through inner dialogues 
even if no one else is interested, resist or tune out the pressures of others, keep 
our selves separate.  (Pascal:  “. . . all the unhappiness of men arises from one 
single fact, that they cannot stay quietly in their own chamber” Pensee 139.)  We 
have good reason to value social discourse--and see social interrelatedness 
everywhere, even where we don’t notice it at first;  but we have equally good 
reason to value the cultivation of private, desert-island discourse and 
individuation. 
So again, my argument is for affirming both sides equally--not a 
compromise but a push for extremity in both directions--and to resist attempts at 
priority or hegemony by either side.  The best way to achieve this goal, to fight 
clear of the trap of partisans on each side fighting to stamp out the other, is to 
remember what rhetoricians sometimes forget though it was Aristotle’s favorite 
phrase (not so much in the Rhetoric, however):  “There is a sense in which . . . .”  
There is a sense, currently much emphasized, in which all language is social.  
This was part of what Aristotle meant in saying humans are “social animals”:  an 
entirely unconnected human is not a human;  an entirely solipsistic mind is not a 
mind.  But just as clearly, there’s another sense in which all language is private.  
Nothing that anyone says or writes can ever be understood by others in the full 
senses in which it is experienced or intended.  Language is the tapping on prison 
walls by individuals in solitary confinement, with only slight chances of being 
heard much less understood.  Not either/or but both/and.  (For more on this 
issue, and on the implications for theory of “in a sense,” see my “In Defense of 
Private Writing.”) 
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When both/and is the goal, it follows that the weaker or neglected 
dimension needs to be strengthened.  Thus, it’s obviously a problem when 
persons are only private and always hold themselves apart and unrelated to 
others and don’t know how to connect or function socially.  But it’s equally 
problematic when people are only social and can only think and use language 
when there are others around to interact with, and can only think thoughts that 
others are interested in or agree with.  Such people are too subject to peer 
pressure;  we use the expression, they “have no mind of their own.”  
As with the other binary oppositions I’ve considered, when all goes well the 
opposed sides can work together and reinforce each other.  The more of a 
social life one has, the richer one’s private life can be.  As Vygotsky and others 
point out, our private life is often a folding in of what was first social.  But it goes 
the other way too:  the more private life one has, that is, the more one is able to 
have conversations with oneself and follow thoughts and feelings in different 
directions from those of people around one, the more richly social a life one can 
have.  Putting it yet another way:  someone with no private life at all is in one 
sense completely social--is nothing but social;  but in another sense this person 
is less richly social for bringing less of her own mental amalgam to the colloquy.  
As Dewey puts it: “The very idea of education is a freeing of individual capacity 
in a progressive growth directed to social aims” (98).  Interpreting Bakhtin, 
Clark and Holquist write:  “And unlike other philosophies that oppose radical 
individualism in the name of the greater primacy of socially organized groups, 
Bakhtin’s philosophy never undercuts the dignity of persons. . . . Inasfar as we 
are all involved in the architectonics of answerability for ourselves and thus for 
each other, we are all authors, creators of whatever order and sense our world 
can have” (348).   
 
 The Epistemology of Experience vs. The Epistemology of Propositions 
The kind of binary thinking I’m advocating here--an approach that tries to 
heighten dichotomies yet maintain the balance and affirm both sides equally--
involves, it seems to me, a special link or even commitment to experience.  
There is a phenomenological bias;  perhaps even a bias toward narrative. 
My own story is paradigmatic.  That is, I came to this approach through my 
experience of writing--primarily an experience of perplexity or even bafflement.  
I quit graduate school when I got so blocked I couldn’t write.  When I finally 
came back five years later I was scared and self-conscious about writing, so for 
four years I scribbled notes to myself--short ones and long ones--about what was 
happening to me as I wrote--especially when things went particularly badly or 
well.  It was from these experiential, often narrative notes that I developed the 
hypothesis that writing was hard because of the conflicting needs to generate-
yet-criticize, control-yet-relinquish-control, say yes-and-no.  My thinking grew 
out of a process of trying to be true to my experience and to find a theory that 
didn’t violate it.   
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I've come to think that this approach to dichotomies honors the complexity 
of experience and the wandering narrative of events.  The approach invites 
experience to precede logic.  And here too of course there is a tradition:  an 
empirical, inductive, pragmatic tradition that favors Aristotle's science over 
Plato's, Bacon over Descartes--and that we see in William James and John 
Dewey.   
You can't say what I've just said, however, without someone quickly 
objecting, "But there is no such thing as experience without theory.  That's naive 
American Romanticism.  Theory is always already in everything we do.  No act 
can be innocent of theory."  But here again this claim--and it has become a 
doctrinal chant--papers over a another binary distinction:  theory vs. practice.  
(Boethius pictures Dame Philosophy with two prominent letters embroidered on 
her robe, Theta and Pi.)  The claim that there is no dichotomy or conflict 
between theory and practice is sloppy thinking and tends to champion theory 
over practice.   
Of course it's true that no act is innocent of premises and implications.  But 
it is a failure of clear thinking to let that fact blind us to a crucial difference--
especially in the realm of experience:  the difference between coming at a piece 
of experience with a conscious and explicit theory in mind vs. coming at it as 
openly as possible--making an effort to try to hold theory at bay and trying to 
notice and articulate what happens. 
It is true that we open ourselves to self-deception when we try to hold 
theory at bay and not articulate our tacit theories:  the theories we "find" are 
liable to be the ones we are already pre-disposed to believe.  But when people 
spend all their time wagging their finger at this danger, they tend to miss a 
crucial experience.  We increase our chances of seeing more complexity and 
contradiction in our experience--and finding new theories or theories that 
surprise us--if we make an effort to honor and attend to experience as closely as 
possible and hold off theorizing for a while.  This process can even lead us to 
theories we are predisposed not to believe--theories we don't like.  We can 
notice these two approaches in two textures of research.  In classroom 
research, for example, one can start with a position or hypothesis and 
consciously look at everything through that lens;   or one can try to take notes 
about what one is seeing and feeling from moment to moment, and wait to see 
what concepts or gestalts emerge.   
Donald Schön has recently articulated and celebrated the tradition of 
research that starts by trying to pay as close attention as possible to one's 
experience.  He talks about "reflective practice" in a movement from practice to 
theory--an approach with a debt to Dewey and Lewin.  Developed even more 
carefully, this tradition has become the discipline of phenomenology, involving 
the attempt to "bracket" or hold to one side the preconceptions derived from 
language or theory.  One can never fully succeed in this attempt, but one can get 
better at it.  Like the discipline of holding off critical thinking or holding off 
awareness of audience, people mustn't say it can't be done just because they 
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haven't learned how to do it.  If we want to get better at attending to experience, 
it helps to notice the competing demands of theory and logic. 
Let me stress again that my enthusiasm for experience and induction is not 
a claim that they are superior or prior or privileged.  I don't claim that induction 
is better than deduction, Aristotle than Plato, Bacon than Descartes, Dewey than 
Derrida.  I am simply resisting a counter claim of priority, an assumption of 
privilege.  I'm simply jostling for fifty percent of the bed.  I am trying to maintain a 
balanced and unresolved opposition in order to prevent either side from being 
slipped into the margin by means of a haughty denial of oppositional thinking.   
In fact I acknowledge that the very position I am arguing for in this paper 
has attained such a degree of generality as to become a theoretical bulldozer 
itself.  To the degree that I fall in love with my theory of opposites, I'm liable to 
use it to bludgeon experience.  But I don't shrink from this recognition.  I have no 
hesitation about turning around and celebrating theory too.  Sometimes it is only 
by bludgeoning experience--for example through being obsessed with 
something--that we can make experience give up secrets that we don't get by 
innocent observation.  (See Burtt for the classic account of how the advances of 
modern science depended on the ability to bludgeon experience.)  Therefore, to 
the degree that I am committed to experience, then I will struggle sometimes to 
hold off my preoccupation with binary thinking and try to keep my eyes and 
pores open to experience that doesn't fit on the saddle of my hobby-horse. 
I want to call attention to a connection between this emphasis on 
experience and the work of some of the earlier figures in the field of 
composition:  Macrorie, Britton, Murray, myself, and others.  What these figures 
had in common--and what seems to me to characterize that moment in the 
history of composition--was a burgeoning interest in the experience of writing.  
There was a mood of excitement about talking about what actually happens as 
we and our students write.  Thus, there was lots of first person writing and 
informal discourse.  And thus the overused term for the movement:  the 
"process approach."  People wanted to talk about their experience of the 
process of writing--not just about the resultant text or product.  "Process" 
means experience.* 
------------------------------------- 
 *It had become more or less commonplace in rhetoric of the 18th and 19th centuries to 
say, "We can't really teach invention.  We can't fathom the mystery of where words and ideas 
come from.  We must remain tacit about that.  But we can teach about the other dimensions of 
rhetoric."  These latter were matters of product (e.g., style and arrangement).  But starting in the 
nineteen sixties people began to say, "Well let's do talk more about invention.  We can say 
something about the experience of finding words and ideas and what it's like when we write." 
 More recently those figures in composition (Britton et al) have begun to be referred to as 
"expressive" or "expressionists."  That term seems to me a problem and I sometimes wonder if it 
is not hostilely motivated.  For the prime originators and theorists who use the term (e.g., James 
Berlin and Jeanette Harris) have tended to use it as a term of disapproval.  None of the 
"expressionists" use the term "expressive" with any centrality, except Britton--and the term 
does not well describe or sum up his views or his work.  I rarely see the term used except by 
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people who identify themselves as not expressive.  I don't recall using the term, and I'm not 
comfortable with it--partly because of its negative connotations, but especially because I can't 
get it to stand still and mean something definite and useful.  If we define it narrowly--"writing that 
expresses how I feel"--it's fairly clear, but no one seems to use it that narrowly any more.  If we 
define it more broadly to mean "writing that expresses what I feel--and see and think," then 
suddenly it is indistinguishable from any other kind of writing.  Thus it seems thankless to try to 
defend "expressive writing."  Chris Burnham is one of the few scholars who has shown himself 
willing to take on the job.  See his "Expressive Rhetoric: A Source Study." 
---------------------------------------------------- 
I see a correlation between this emphasis on the experience or process of 
writing and a willingness to articulate contraries and leave them unresolved.  To 
be open and honest about experience leads to unresolved and conflicting 
propositions.  This opening period of the "process" movement in composition 
corresponds, I'd say, to the moment when literary critics were interested in 
reader response criticism:  "Let's try to tell what actually happens to us as we 
read."  (I called this "giving movies of the reader's mind" in Writing without 
Teachers in 1973).  But since then, scholars in both literature and composition 
(with the notable exception of some feminists) have tended to back away from 
this interest in talking honestly and personally about their own experience.  An 
autobiographical openness about one's own experience doesn't seem to fit 
comfortably with our current model of academic scholarship. 
Thus I call the approach to binaries that I'm talking about an epistemology 
of experience--whereas an insistence on logical coherence is more an 
epistemology of propositions. 
 
 
   Epistemology and Rhetoric 
The kind of binary thinking I am celebrating here seems to suggest an 
epistemological skepticism:  a distrust of language and of the possibilities of 
knowing (see Gibson for a good collection of pieces about the limitations of 
language).  But actually, I think the epistemological picture is a bit more sunny.  
For this tradition of binary thinking actually suggests a world of things outside us 
and our language that we can have a kind of commerce with--even though our 
minds and language and our system of logic are not ideally fitted to them.  If we 
can learn to balance irreconcilable propositions in our minds (at least if they are 
helpful propositions), and not rush for closure, dominance, or hierarchy, we can 
make some sort of approach to knowledge of a complex world that exists 
outside our minds. 
There is an important link here between binary thinking and metaphor.  
Just as new metaphors are always created out of a conflict or contradiction (a 
contradiction between how the word or phrase is being used and the right or 
literal meaning of the word or phrase), and just as new metaphors often point at 
something which is not yet signified by words (see my "Nondisciplinary 
Courses" 22-32), so too a well-maintained, unresolved opposition can point at 
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something that cannot be or has not yet been otherwise articulated.  The 
physicists have gotten used to this sort of thing with their conclusion that light 
must unavoidably be described as both wave and particle.  Both models or 
descriptions must be upheld despite their mutual contradiction. 
What interests me for this essay is the paradoxical relationship between 
this epistemology of contradiction and rhetoric.  Even though I'm arguing 
throughout for more difference, more contradiction--more of what Boethius 
called "war" between truths--I think I'm opening a door to a rhetoric that is less 
warlike or adversarial. 
Look at how rhetoric and persuasion and argument usually work.  When 
people argue and call each other wrong, they tend to assume that only one side 
can be right.  Or putting this the other way around (as Graff does), when people 
assume that only one answer can be right, they tend to engage in more conflict:  
they are struggling for a single prize in a win/lose arena. 
But if we celebrate binary thinking of the sort I've been describing, there's 
every chance of discovering that both parties to the argument are right--despite 
their disagreement.  Their two claims, even though completely contradictory, 
might both be accurate and useful views of the complex phenomena they are 
fighting about.  If they were more open to the epistemology of contradiction, 
they might come closer to a full description and understanding of the complex 
issue by affirming and entering into each others' propositions (without having to 
give up allegiance to their own).  After all, none of the blind men in the fable were 
wrong when they gave contradictory descriptions of the elephant.  But their 
views were seriously flawed by narrowness of perspective.  In the tradition of 
binary thinking, there is less need to try to force people to agree.  Thus John 
Trimbur's essay celebrating dissensus or the limits of consensus has been 
extremely fruitful and influential in the profession--coming as it does out of the 
tradition of Bruffee and his consensus-based model of social construction. 
My interest in affirming oppositions, then, connects with my interest in 
nonadversarial, nonviolent, nonoppositional rhetoric:  rhetoric as believing 
game (see my "Methodological Believing").  More and more people are noticing 
the problems with either/or rhetoric:  the assumption that in order to argue for a 
position, we must argue against the contrary position as wrong.  Conventional 
argumentative and persuasive discourses so often start out by trying to show 
that the other view is wrong.  Lakoff and Johnson, in their exploration of the tacit 
"metaphors we live by," show how deeply enmeshed our culture is in the 
assumption that "argument equals war."   
Apart from any epistemological considerations, this conventional warfare 
approach tends to backfire on psychological grounds.  If I want you to consider 
my point of view, I will have a harder time if I first try to get you to confess you 
are stupid or mistaken for holding yours.  And I'll increase my chances of 
success if I, in turn, am able to see the truth of your view. 
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Many conditions in the world have conspired to help us see more clearly 
than ever the limits of an either/or model for dealing with conflict.  Even in the 
highly adversarial realms of warfare and litigation, it turns out that mediation 
and negotiation are more and more sought out.  In rhetoric itself then, we should 
not be surprised to find more explorations of alternative models for handling 
conflict. (See the extensive exploration of "Rogerian rhetoric," for example in 
Brent and Teich.  For feminist explorations of non-adversarial rhetoric, see Frey 
and Lamb.  Also Ong has a fascinating exploration of the long history of the 
adversarial and irenic traditions in our culture.)  It's my contention, then, that the 
kind of binary thinking I describe here--an epistemology of contradiction--will 
help people get unstuck from either/or, zero-sum, adversarial models of 
rhetoric. 
At this point, some readers will be itching to accuse me of not practicing 
what I preach.  For if I am so interested in nonadversarial rhetoric and the 
believing game, why am I fighting so hard in this essay--using the very kind of 
good/bad binary thinking that I profess to be against?  And why in my career 
have I so often seemed to take partisan stands?   
For I have certainly been partisan.  I've always written more excitedly about 
generating than revising, and been preoccupied if not obsessed with 
freewriting.  I've certainly celebrated private writing and the ability to turn off 
awareness of audience during certain points in the writing process.  I've made 
more noise about teachers as allies than as critical, evaluative adversaries.  And 
I've campaigned my whole career for the believing game.   
But there are two goals for fighting:  fighting for the sake of being heard vs. 
fighting for the sake of keeping the other person from being heard;  fighting to 
create dialogue vs. fighting to insist on monologue.  I am fighting here to make a 
case for binary thinking in a climate that considers it a cardinal sin.  I'm not 
fighting to wipe out the sometimes necessary practice of good/bad binary 
thinking, or to prevent the often useful practice of framing issues in terms of 
multiple positions.  And as for the practice of fighting itself, here is a case where 
I want to break out of binary thinking.  That is, it's not an either/or choice 
between fighting and not fighting--between trying to exterminate the enemy or 
her position or else going into a kind of nonviolent limpness.  There is an 
important third option.  We can fight with someone to try to get them to listen to 
us to or to consider our view--fight hard--and yet nevertheless not press them at 
all to give up their view.  (Of course it sometimes seems as though the enemy's 
only "view" is that our view must be stamped out--and so we feel we have no 
choice but to try to stamp out theirs.  But mediators and negotiators have 
learned to be skilled in this situation:  helping people to articulate the positive 
goals or views or needs that lie behind their merely negative goal of wiping out 
the enemy's goal.) 
I've always made it clear that my partisan behavior was grounded in my 
epistemological commitment to binary thinking.  Because there has been such a 
one-sided tradition in the teaching of writing--a tradition that says, "Always plan, 
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maintain vigilance, use critical thinking"--I've seen a clear need to make a louder 
noise in favor of clearing away time for non-planning, generating, freewriting, 
and holding off critical consciousness.  But in all of my fighting for the 
generative, I've never argued against critical consciousness, doubting, 
criticism, or radical cutting--only for an equal emphasis on both sides--a 
stronger contradiction--what D. H. Lawrence called the "trembling instability of 
the balance" (172).  I've always been explicit about my commitment to subject 
matter and even evaluation in teaching;  and to doubting in thinking and 
learning.  And when it comes to the opposition between the private vs. the social 
dimension in writing, I would claim some credit (with my Writing Without 
Teachers in 1973) for helping the profession become interested in the social and 
collaborative dimension of writing in the first place. 
Thus I would invite readers to compare the rhetorical shape of my writing 
with that of people who are extremely critical of my work (e.g., James Berlin and 
Jeanette Harris).  I may permit myself unabashed enthusiasm and open 
partisanship;  they use more modulated tones of alleged judiciousness.  But 
compare the rhetorical goals to see who is trying to silence and who is trying to 
sustain a dialogue.   
In fact, what really needs explaining is why there has been such a tendency 
to see me as one-sided and extreme--to see me as someone only interested in 
generating, making a mess, and the private dimension--to be blind to my support 
for critical thinking, revising, doubting, and the social dimension in writing--
when I preach over and over this theme of embracing contraries and of trying to 
get opposites into unresolved tension with each other.  That is, I'm criticized for 
being narrow or one-sided, sometimes on epistemological grounds, but really 
the criticism itself represents an epistemological poverty of thinking.  It is 
fashionable now to celebrate indeterminacy and epistemological doubt, yet even 
radical theorists often fall into assuming that if anyone argues in favor of 
feelings, private discourse, or the relinquishing of control, she must by definition 
be against thinking, analysis, logic, and the social dimension--whatever they say 
to the contrary.  I can't help believing, then, that an epistemology grounded in 
the tradition of binary thinking highlighted here can lead to more large 
mindedness. 
So how do we learn or develop this kind of epistemology or this habit of 
dialectical thinking?  One important way we learn it is through interaction with 
others:  through dialogue.  After all, that's the original link that Socrates and 
Plato had in mind in their original conception of "dialectic":  bring people into 
conversation in order to create conflict among ideas.  Dialogue leads to 
dialectic.   
So just as we learn to talk privately to ourselves by internalizing social 
conversation with others (as Mead and Vygotsky tell us), so we can learn this 
useful kind of binary or dialectical thinking from conversation.  That is, our 
greatest source of difference and dichotomy is when people of different minds 
come together.  So in addition to calling for an "epistemology of contradiction," I 
  44 
could also call it an "epistemology of dialogue" or (to be fashionable) a "dialogic 
epistemology."  But it's not enough to have dialogue between opposing views if 
the dialogue is completely adversarial.  The dialogue we need comes when 
participants can internalize both views--can enlarge their minds and their 
assumptions--instead of just digging in and fighting harder for their own view.  
So it's a question of what kind of dialogue we have.  The views may clash, but 
can the parties cooperate or collaborate in the dialogue?  We learn rhetorical 
warfare from dialogue with rhetorical warriors, but we learn dialectical large 
mindedness from dialogue with people who have learned an epistemology of 
dialogue or contradiction. 
The epistemology that tends to be dominant today among scholars and 
academics in the humanities is dialectical in one sense:  It says, in effect, "I 
believe X and you believe Y, and there is no real truth or right answer in the back 
of the book to tell us who is right.  So we can keep on fighting."  What I'm looking 
for is a dialectical epistemology that is more generous and hopeful--an 
epistemology that says, "I believe X and you believe Y, yet by gum we may well 
both be right--absolutely right.  If we work together we might well get a richer 
understanding than either of us so far has."    
Notice finally, then, two different relationships here between epistemology 
and rhetoric.  In the dominant tradition, we have eternal warfare between people 
(rhetoric) because the people don't maintain eternal warfare between concepts 
inside their heads (epistemology).  It's possible to have it the other way around:  
eternal warfare between concepts in the head, resulting in more cooperation 
and less zero-sum warfare between people.  (Readers not interested in 
theoretical issues in the fields of rhetoric and composition might skip to my 
concluding paragraph.) 
 
   Dialectic and Rhetoric 
In the previous section, I focused on the role of people and rhetorical 
structures.  In this final section I will focus on language.  I will suggest that there 
is a realm of language use or discourse that is a particularly useful site for 
encouraging the kind of binary thinking that helps concepts and ideas to live in 
fruitful tension.  I see this realm as different from rhetoric and I suggest that we 
might call it dialectic.  Dialectic and rhetoric represent contrasting if not 
absolutely conflicting uses of language.   
The dichotomy between dialectic and rhetoric was central to Plato and 
Aristotle, but now it is widely neglected or denied--mostly because dialectic is 
enormously unfashionable and rhetoric is the dominant term.  Some say indeed 
that rhetoric covers all language use (see Eagleton for a prominent instance).  I 
wonder if there might be a link between three current attitudes I am seeing in 
many rhetoricians and literary critics:  a neglect of dialectic as a realm or 
category of language use, a knee-jerk criticism of dichotomies and dichotomous 
thinking, and an attraction to rhetoric as the master term. 
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To deny the dichotomy between rhetoric and dialectic represents yet again 
the papering over of a power imbalance--an aggrandizing move by rhetoric.  
When people say everything is X (e.g., all language use is rhetoric) they are 
making a move to push difference and opposition off the map:  no conflict.  I 
would sound the warning again:  beware proclamations of no conflict.  My aim is 
to show the fruitfulness of a conflict between dialectic and rhetoric as two uses 
of language. 
The easiest way to dismiss dialectic and claim that everything is rhetoric is 
to deny the very grounds given by Plato and Aristotle for the distinction between 
the two realms of discourse.  Plato saw dialectic as the realm of truth and 
correct reasoning, and rhetoric as the realm of deception.  Aristotle saw 
dialectic as the realm of certain knowledge, and rhetoric as the realm of 
probable knowledge.  (They too, of course, were making a power play and 
claiming superiority for dialectic.)  But now, since "everyone" agrees that there 
is no such thing as truth or certain knowledge (do we have certainty about the 
lack of certainty?), it would seem obvious that there is nothing left but rhetoric.  
All language use is interested or partisan--and thus ultimately an act of 
persuasion. 
It's not easy to fight this claim;  in a sense I agree with it.  Yet I think I can 
argue usefully, if speculatively, for a realm of language use called dialectic that 
differs from rhetoric.  What is "rhetoric"?  The term is rubbery, but I think it's fair 
to define it as language designed to have an effect on an audience.  More 
traditionally and narrowly, it has been defined as language to persuade.  And 
"dialectic"?  I am not defining it as the realm of truth or certain knowledge, but 
rather as the realm of language whose goal is not to persuade or not even for 
the sake of having an effect on audience.  Putting it positively, dialectic is the 
use of language where the prime goal is to make meaning rather than deploy 
that meaning toward an effect:  to get meanings, concepts, and words to 
interact with each other in order to see where they go;  to "figure out" or 
"figure."  (With the term "figure" I am thinking of the activity of doing 
calculations with numbers.  Would aggrandizers for rhetoric claim that all 
mathematical calculations are rhetoric?)  We might even think of dialectic as the 
realm of language as play--language for its own sake rather than for effect.  The 
central thing, then, is that we are using language in such a way that there is not 
the pressure of trying for an effect on an audience--the pressure of rhetoric. 
In the present critical climate, this is a slippery and controversial notion.  
And there is overlap between the categories (more about that below).  So it will 
help to give some examples: 
(a) There is a clear contrast in the realm of law between a legal brief and a 
legal memorandum (or more precisely an office memorandum).  A brief lies 
squarely in the realm of rhetoric:  its goal is to persuade the court;  to win.  
In contrast, an office memorandum sits squarely in the realm of language 
use that I call dialectic.  A legal dictionary defines the office memorandum 
as "an informal discussion of the merits of a matter pending in a lawyer's 
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office;  usually written by a law clerk or junior associate for the benefit of a 
senior associate or partner" (Gifis 296).  The "benefit" spoken of here is not 
to argue or persuade or plead for one side, but rather to figure out 
everything that can be said on both sides or--as some people put it, to 
figure out how a perfect judge or a legal God would rule.  The difference 
between rhetoric and dialectic is intriguingly highlighted by material or 
procedural ruling:  under the law, an office memorandum is legally 
"protected from discovery" (296) so that the other team cannot see it.  The 
fact that the memorandum is legally "private" helps it be an act of figuring 
out rather than an act of rhetoric. 
(b) I think we most often use language for dialectic in a more private way--
writing or talking or verbally thinking for ourselves.  I'm not claiming that all 
private discourse is dialectic.  As Burke and others point out, we often 
address language to ourselves for the sake of having an effect or being 
winning towards that audience of "me."  Still, privacy is a realm that at least 
invites dialectic:  not trying to have an effect on ourselves but to explore or 
follow a train of thought.   
      For example, when I am dealing with an issue where I have a position and 
disagree with others, I find I have a better chance of understanding the 
issue if I leave the rhetorical realm, stop addressing them, take myself out 
of their hearing, and speak to myself in private.  ("What if I'm wrong?  Let's 
see what happens if I consider such and such evidence more seriously.  
Could I admit that I'm wrong?")  Someone might object that this kind of 
private language for making meaning or figuring something out is 
nevertheless language designed to have "an effect" on my audience of self-
-namely the effect of clarifying my thinking or my position.  But this is 
clearly not what Burke or most of us mean when we talk about "language 
designed to have an effect on an audience."  To stretch the word rhetoric to 
cover all discourse--by definition--is to lose the word.  
     When I am engaged in the rhetorical task of writing to persuade and I get 
confused or stuck, I've learned sometimes to take a fresh sheet or open a 
temporary file and start exploring my perplexity for myself.  "What am I 
really trying to say here?  I think X but I feel Y" and so on.  Up till that point I 
had been addressing my language to readers for the sake of making a point 
or having an effect.  But in order to make this move into the realm of 
dialectic, a crucial internal event must happen.  I have to make a little act of 
letting go and giving up full commitment to my position--to my hunger to 
persuade.  Of course I reserve to myself the right to go back afterwards 
and battle for X--no matter what I discover in my little fishing trip.  Indeed, 
as an incentive to practice dialectic or binary thinking, I can even console 
myself on pragmatic or rhetorical grounds:  "I'll probably do better at 
fighting for X and increase my chances of 'winning' if I take this detour into 
the realm of dialectic and figure out whether the position I want to win with 
is right or wrong."  I've got to write myself a little office memorandum. 
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(c) When naive scientists say they stay objective and write nothing but facts, 
current critics and theorists reply, "Haven't you read Thomas Kuhn?  There 
is no objectivity or factuality--even in science.  All language is interested 
and biased."  But that reply again papers over an important distinction in 
the interests of a power play, and it is a move that explains why so many 
scientists, even very sophisticated ones, resist the uses that many 
humanists and social scientists make of Kuhn.  Of course most scientists 
know that genuine objectivity, truth, or factuality is not attainable:  certainty 
cannot be had.  Yet for some pieces of discourse--even some very public 
pieces--they nevertheless and unabashedly measure their success by how 
close they come to exactly those goals:  objectivity, truth, factuality, even 
certainty!  Even though the goal is unattainable, it is still possible to 
measure the value of discourse by how close it comes.  In short, there is a 
crucial difference between using language to have an effect or make a case 
and using language to try to come as close as possible to objectivity or 
facts.   
This is a complex and controversial issue, and I don't mind admitting that I 
am trying to work it out for the first time here.  It seems to me that this is a issue 
where we need to be smart enough to use Aristotle's formulation, "In a sense, . . 
."  That is, in one sense--or through one lens or to some degree or another--all 
language is addressed and for an effect:  all language has a rhetorical 
dimension.  But in another sense, all language is meaning-making, figuring out, 
or the play of meaning:  all language has a dialectical dimension.  This way of 
talking helps us call attention to a spectrum of language uses.  At one end are 
discourses in which the rhetorical use predominates.  Rhetoric was developed 
in response to speech making and public writing--language uses where there is 
a natural emphasis on having an effect on an audience.  But there is another end 
to this spectrum where we find discourses in which the dialectical use 
predominates.  Much of our private writing and verbal thinking is discourse of 
this sort.   
Therefore it is not only helpful to use both terms;  it would be a distortion 
and an oversimplification (and a power play) to restrict ourselves to just one 
term or "sense" or lens for observing and describing the whole spectrum of 
language use.  At this cultural moment when the rhetorical lens is in the 
ascendant, I see a need to pay attention to those times when we use language 
with more open curiosity, more interest in mere figuring out, more willingness to 
let things turn out any which way.  It might be that most of our language use is 
heavily rhetorical--addressed and for effect;  it might be that the rhetorical is the 
path of habit.  But it makes no sense to call all language rhetorical just because 
there's always a trace of pressure or effect, or because one hasn't learned to 
use (or notice using) language in a more dialectical fashion.   
And course these pieces of discourse produced under the goals of 
dialectic--figuring-outs--can slide into or be developed into or indeed be used as 
they are for rhetorical goals:  as address to audience for an effect.  It seems to 
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me that some of my forays into the dialectic uses of language in the process of 
writing this paper have helped me create--and sometimes even been used--in 
the rhetoric here.   
   *  *  * 
Let me close by trying for a quick summary overview of this ambitious 
essay.  I am exploring and celebrating one kind of binary thinking:  the 
affirmation or nonresolution of opposed ideas.  I'm arguing that this kind of 
thinking often yields a better model for understanding complex activities like 
writing and vexed oppositions like teaching/research.  If we sophisticate our 
epistemology by recognizing that contrary claims can both be right or accurate, 
we can encourage a less adversarial rhetoric.  We can invite people to 
emphasize positive arguments for their position and de-emphasize negative 
arguments against the opposed position--since it may also be valid or correct.  
In short we can encourage more productive warfare in our heads and less 
destructive warfare between people.  Finally (maintaining yet another dichotomy 
that people tend to run away from), we will probably do better at encouraging 
productive binary thinking if we acknowledge a realm or motive of language use 
that particularly invites it, namely dialectic as opposed to rhetoric.* 
----------------------- 
*Many people over the years have given m helpful responses and suggestions on this thinking—
too many to name or even remember.  But I’m particularly grateful to Charles Moran, John 
Trimbur, Robin Varnum, and Elizabeth Wallace for their help. 
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